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The paper develops a simple model of optimal corporate ownership structure in which
costs and benefits of ownership concentration are analysed. The main question ad-
dressed is how to reconcile the liquidity benefits obtained through dispersed corporate
ownership with control of management, which is effective only with sorne degree of
ownership concentration. One option is for a firm to create and maintain a controlling
block, thus licniting ownership dispersion. Another is to seek maxinnrrn ownership
dispersiou and rely un secondary trading to create a controlling interest. wheu needed.
The, p.~l~cr analyses these options and provides criteria for the optimal choice of own-
rrship ,tructin~e.
Kcy ~~ords: Ownership Structure, Corporate Control, Liquidity, Ownership Concen-
tration, Block Pricing, Free Rider Problem.1 ) lutruductiou
I'hr rcct,td iucutrt)~lct~~ cuntr:~cting approach in Corpor,ttt~ E'in.u~-rr La; cousidcrabh-
ilnproved our understanding of how srnall firms determine their capital structure. The
basic setting considered in this line of research is one where a founder-manager seeks
funding from one or several financiers. The main premise is that the founder-rnanager,
itt Ler dealings with the financiers, is prirna.rily concerned with maintaining her private
benefits of control. For small firms these are often quite large relative to the financial
returns. 1'lrus, for a small firm the problem of deterrnining the financial structure often
reduces to the problem of how to obtain funding by giving away as little control as
possible to the financiers. Of course, most financiers insist on some fornr of protection,
so that the final compromise reached in most financial contracts for small firms is one
resembling a debt contract (or a venture capital contract) which protects the founder-
rnanager's control as long as the firm is performing adequately.[
This perspective for small firnts does not extend naturally to large firms, since
thc pri~ate benefits of control of the managers for these firnrs are likely to be small
rclat.ivo to the firm's monetary returns, so that the protection of thesc benefits is no
longer an ocr.rriding consideration. Moreover, large firms tend to have more dispersed
ownership and therefore less effective investor control. If anything, the main control
problem for large firms seems to be how to get investors or shareholders to exert more
control. Indeed, this is the problem that the recent literature on corporate governance
has focused on.Z
Interestingly, there is little variation accross nations in the capital structure of small
firms, while for large firms the problem of inducing more effective investor control has
been tackled ve.ry differently. In broad terms, there have been t.wu diffcrcut responses.
In the l;5 and the liK primarily, share-ownership in large firrns is widely dispersed,
t.urnover is high, and investor control is often exerted through the threat of takeovers.
In othcr conntries, share-ownership is more concentrated; turnover is much lower, and
control is exerted, if at all, by the largest shareholders (or debtholders). Three countries
that exemplify this type of financial system are Germany, France and Japan.3
~ Fcr a recent discussion ot this literature see Hart ( ]995).
Z Surveys o[ recent research on corporate governance are Fojima ( 1395) and Shlei(er and Vishny ( 1995).
f'or a discussion ot the recent policy debate on corporate go~ernance see also The Gconomist ( 1994).
i For a description uf the main di(Eerences between the financial systems u( the CS and the UK, on the
one hand, and Germany, Frante and ]apan, on the other. see Franks and ~laver ( 1994) and Kojima
(1995).
IR:hcu evaluatiug the differences uf thc~r t~~-o ty-pes of sysu,tus. it is iluportant to
rcalise that the issue is not whether ownership conccntration per se is desirable or not.
Tlrt~ issue rathcr is how often aud at what poiuts in :3 1irln~s life ownership shoulcl he con-
centrated. One alternative for the design of ownersltip structure is persistent ownership
concentration, where a large blockholder is expected to exercise control of management
COI1tIIIllollSly; the other is ownership dispersion, with reliance on secondary market trad-
ing to create concentration whelrever necessary for intervention in rnanagerial decísion
making. This paper develops a framework in which the costs and benefits of the two
systems - dispersed ownership combined with a takeover nrechanism on the one lland,
and large controlling blocks (or "noyaux durs"), on the other - can be evaluated. The
benefits of dispersion are mainly greater mazket liquidity and better risk-diversification.4
The benefits of concentration are that effective shareholder control, when it is needed,
is more likely. Our main hypothesis is that there is a tradeoff between these two bene-
fits and that control and liquidity represent two sides of the same coin: improvíng one
means impairing thc other.
Scveral empirical studies have documented that the liquidity of a stock is larger the
Ialger thc market capitalization of the firm. The explanations for this finding that are
usually given relate in one way or another to the presence of transactions costs which
limit market participation.s Thus, for example, if market makers face set-up costs, the
number of market makers dealing in a stock will be increasing - and, therefore, liquidity
will be increasing - in the mazket capitalization of that stock. Similarly, if market
participants face information asymmetries, the number of investors willing to invest in
information acquisition in a particulaz stock will be increasing in the anticipated gains
from trade and, hence, in the stock's market capitalization.
This argument immediately implies that when a firm decides to set up a controlling
block, it reduces the number of shazeholders who can participate in the trade of the
firm's stock and, therefore, effectively reduces the market capitalization, and hence
the liquidity, of its stock. This is the principal mechanism relating concentration and
liquidity in our model.
Besides limited market participation by potential shareholders, the model builds
"Che modcl we develop focuses on the liquidity benehts ot dispersion- We abstract lrom risk-diversifica.
tion issues mostly to keep the model tractable. For an anal}'sis of the impact of risk sharing on corporate
control sce Admati, P(leiderer, and 'Lechner (1994),
See (or example, Demsetz ( 1968), I3rennan (1975), ~lerton ( 1987), C:rossman and Miller ( 1986), Pagano
(1989), and Allen and Gale (1994).
}~,tt t~~u ulllrr Icty~ ~~ssunt,~tiuus. P~ilst, it 1, assunlecl that sonle degret. ul uwnership
concentration does indeed improve control of managernent and, therefore, increases firm
~ a1uc. Thurc i~ .r large body uf cruss-aectional evidence in support of this assmnption,"
but there are also well-known counterexamples. These include the cases of large owners
who have managed the company for very long periods (Jolmson et al., 1985), or of
management-affiliated blockholders who allow management to dilute share value away
frorn other shareholders (Wruck, 1989). We are aware of these cases, but we do not
consider them in this paper.
Second, it is assumed that by exercising control a(large) shareholder incurs net
private costs. This assumption may appeaz stronger than the first one, in light of
some of the empirical evidence on the pricing of corporate control transactions. Bazclay
~rnd Holderness (1989), for example, find that large blocks of shares mostly trade at a
premium, which they argue results from private benefits accruing to the blockholder. As
we discuss in Section 3, however, the empirical evidence on block pricing reflects several
clifferent e.lenlents of which the eosts of controlling management are only one.~ Indeed,
onr main .justification for focussing on the costs rather than the benefits of control is
t']upirical. If private benefits of control were, in general, more. important than private
costs, corporate governance would be a relatively minor problem: the real problem
would be to select among the bids for large blocks of shares who volunteer to control
rnanagement. This is not the typical situation we observe in the US, to which the above
mentioned studies refer - the importance of blockholders with private benefits of control
notwithstanding.
Building on these assumptions, our model yields several simple and interesting in-
sights. In particular, the analysis shows that a firm is more likely to choose a dispersed
ownership structure, other things equal, if there is more active trading in its secondary
market and if regulation facilitates takeovers as a means to acquire control. Comple-
]rtenting this, we find that. greaker ]iquidity trading in the secondary market by itself
facilitates takeovers by reducing free-riding. These observations shed some new light on
the issue why the US and the UK have such different capital and governance structures
in large firms from those observed in Germany, France or Japan. In particular, in the
6 For publidv traded firms in the U.S. sce, for example, Jensen and Warner (1988), Wruck (1989), or
F3arclay and Holderness (1991). For evidence on French and German listed companies, see Franks,
Mayeq and Renneborg (1995).
- Harclay and F{olderness ( 1989), in view o( the sizeable number of discounts in their sample, "suggest
that block o~..nersLip involves private costs as well as private benefits"(Harclay and Holderness, 1989).
3L-S slld the CI~ the takeover ulechanisn] is ntuch less restrirteci, ihert~ art~ stricter legal
restrictious on institutional equity holdings, and secondary rnarket participation by ilr
Stitutional investors is greater and more frequent.` All these feature, f~tvor ownership
dispersion in our model.
More generally, our analysis shows that both types of ownership structure - con-
centrated or dispersed ownership - can be optimal, depending on the characteristics
of the firm and the environment in which it operates. Our comparative statics re-
sults show that higher average liquidity demand of investors, lower costs of controlling
management, higher potential benefits from correcting managerial failures, and higher
transactions costs for secondary mazket trading all favour a dispersed ownership struc-
ture, and vice versa for concentration. Our model is set up to apply in principle to
both listed and unlisted firms. Concerning unlisted firms, it is therefore interesting to
note that the above characteristics hold - at least to a first approximation - for law and
accounting partnerships, which are well-known examples of private firms with dispersed
ownership structures (see, e.g., Hansmann, 1995).
For publicly listed cornpanies, where empirical data are best, our ]nodel provides
a ne~w explanation for why equity block purchase agreements usually are priced at
sizeable discounts, while trades of existing blocks are not.9 Our explanation is that
single shares and blocks, when traded, must reflect the anticipated costs of corporate
control equally, since, by azbitrage, one type of seller cannot be treated differently from
another. Anticipating that he will not be fully compensated for holding the block in
future trading, however, a block purchaser will demand a discount at the issue stage.
There is a large literature related to several aspects of our model. This literature
almost exclusively ís concerned with large listed companies, whereas the argument of
the present paper applies to privately held firms, as well. A closely related paper is
Pagano and R5e11 (1995), who consider a privately held firm with a large shareholder
who needs to incrcase its capital base by bringing in new shareholders. The firm has the
option of remaining private and introducing another set of large shareholders, or going
public and getting a new set of small shareholders. The benefit of the former option
is that the firm does not have to pay listing costs. The downside is that there may be
excessive monitoring by large sharehohíers (as in Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1994))
8 In the IJS, for example, actively managed pension funds hold shares for an average of only 1.9 years
(Kojima, 1995), and on the NYSE alone, institutions accoun[ for 72 percent of trading volume.
y See Barclay and Holderness (1989) and Hertzel and Smith (1993) for a description of the empirical
puzzle.
4~.u~i tliut tltc ~tuCk ~~ lcs5 h~{u1d.
~Ierr,un (1987) introduces asymmetric information in t.he standard CAP?VI to obtain
~i niuclel in which investors only trade in the lirnited number of shares about which thev
have information. His model gíves rise to the type of limited market participation we
cousider in the present paper - in fact, our model of secondary market trading can be
iuterpreted as a reduced form of Merton's model for one single stock -, but Merton
(1987) does not consider corporate control issues.
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) analyse how large shareholders can facilitate takeovers.
In their modcl concentration has no downside. Admati, Pfleiderer and Zechner (1994)
take a similar view to ours on the benefits of large shareholder intervention, and ask to
what extent these benefits can be realized by risk-averse investors who optimize their
portfolio choice. Kahn and Winton (1995) argue that market liquidity can undermine
effectivc control by a large shareholder by giving him excessive, incentives to speculate
rather t,han monitor. In contrast, Holmstr6m and Tirole (1993) argue that insider
trading by a large sharcholder provides incentives to monitor management but result~
iu a highcr cost of capital for thc firnr.
Rccent papers that are related to our analysis of the free-rider problem are Zingales
(1995} and Gromb (1993), who show how free riding by small shareholders can be used to
increase the ex-ante value of the firm. Also, Bebchuk (1994) considers the problem of the
trading mechanism of controlling blocks when large shareholders obtain both monetary
and private benefits of control; he contrasts the equal opportunity rule (according to
which minority shareholders can participate in the sale of a block on the same terms
as large ones) and the market rule (where no distinction is drawn between shareholders
according to the size of their holdings).
In an interesting historical study, Bhide (1993) has argued that political consid-
crations have helped shape the development of U.S. capital markets towards higher
li~luidity and lower investor activism, thus prociding evídence for oue manifestation of
the tradeoff studied in our paper. ~~he come back to his study in Section 4 below.
Finally, it is worth mentioning a recent study by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes;
Shleifer and Vishny (1996) who take quite a different perspective on the observed inter-
national differences in ownership concentration. They regress ownership concentration
on several measures of law and law enforcement in different countries and argue that
the lack of adequate minority shareholder protection in Germany, France and Japan
relative to the US (and the UK) may be a cause for the differences in financial systems.
We shall discuss more of the relevant empirical literature in the main body of the paper.
5'I'he org.nrisation of the rest of this paper is :~, follo~cs: Sectiau 2 clescribes our
model. Section 3 analyses the two polar forms of ownership structure relevant in the
preserlt model, and Section 4 evaluaces the tradeoff between the tivo. Section 5 concludea
with some remarks about the scope of the analysis.
2) The Model
Consider a firm that operates for two time-periods, t- 1, 2. At time t- 0, the
original owners want to sell the firm and issue shazes, which give rights to the firm's
future returns. We assume that because of transaction costs these claims cannot be
split into arbitrarily fine units, so that the ntunber of shares, M, is finite.lo
Tkrere is a large number of potential investors in the firm's shares. To simplify our
analysis, we assume that investors are sufFiciently wealthy to buy up the whole firrn if
they wish." Each investor i can invest in a safe, liquid asset whose net rate of return
is rrormalized to zero, or in shares of the firm. If there are n investors each buying hó
shazes in t- 0, the initial ownership structure is (hó, ..., hó ), with ~~ t hó - M. We
denote the price of the firm at the issue date in t- 0 by Vo.
Even if investors can afford to buy the whole firm they may not want to, for liq-
uidity reasons. Following Gorton and Pennacchi (1990) and others, we model investors'
demand for liquidity as follows. Each investor has liquidity needs in the future, which
arise either in period 1 or 2. At time t- 0, the timing of these needs is unknown to ev-
erybody, and all investors have the following identical expected utility from consumption
in periods t- 1 and t- 2:
u~cl~~z~ - q~r f ( 1 - q)cz.
lo
(1)
M is an exogenous constant to the model, determined by the costs of trading, and typically smaller than
the phpsical number of shares. On the NYSE, for example, 56 percent of trading volume is accounted
for by trades ot blocks of ]0, 000 or more shares. Hence, following Demsetz ( 1968), M is determined by
the following logic: the easier it is to trade the firm's shares, the lower can be the values traded, hence,
the smaller is the shares' e(fective denomination, and the higher M.
Introducing wealth constraints is conceptually not difficult, but technically somewhat complicated, and
does not change our main results. We discuss weallh constraints as we go along in the analysis and in
the Conclusion.
~~Vhcu iucrsturs Luy shares, thc~- cio aot hnow ~xactlt~ whcn thcy ~ci11 want to
cousume. If they want to consume earlv (which happens with probability q), then they
lluve to sell their shares; if they want to cousun(c later, they rnay buy more shares. The.
consumption shocks of investors are assumed to be independent. Thus, even though
investors are identical ex ante, they generally have different liquidity needs ex post, and
yifo can be interpreted as average liquidity demand by existing shareholders. We shall
refer to investors who want to consume early as "impatient" and to those who can wait
until period t- 2 as "patient". The preferences specified in (1) provide the simplest
possible speci.ication of liquidity prPferences.l1
The trading of shares following the liquidity shocks in t- 1 typically depends
on the institutional framework in which the firm operates. The specific structure of
trading is largely irrelevant for our analysis, and we choose the simplest: We assume
t,hat after preference shocks have been realised, aggregate liquidity demand becomes
publicly known and the following three-stage bidding game is played.
1- Pa.tient investors simultaneously rnake unrestricted offers for shares.
2. If Lherc are two or more identical offers, one is selected at random.
3. All owners can tender their shares to the selected buyer at the offered price.
This mechanism implies maximum competition between potential buyers and re-
solves the coordination problem between identical bids which can cause existence prob-
lems.l~ Furtlrermore, outside investors and existing owners bid for shares on equal
terms.
Having defined liquidity needs and trading, we now turn to the firrn's return struc-
ture and, consequently, to the problem of corporate control. We assume that the firm
has stochastic returns in t- 1 and t- 2 which are both determined and publicly ob-
served in t- 1 and, for simplicity, assumed to be identical.14 With probability rr the
1z In particular, these pre(erences exhibit risk neutrality with respect to intra-period consumption. We
could have used a more general specification without, howeveq gaining much further insigh[. See ]acklin
(1987) and von Thadden (1994) (or a discussion of more general approaches to modelling liquidity
pre(erences.
1~ Because we assume below that an owner can invest a fized cost in order to control management, the
number o( shares bought either in Walcasian trading or under standard Bertrand competition determines
profits. Therefore, without a coordination stage such as 2. the payofT (unctions of market participants
are not upper-hemitontinuous. The assumption that líquidity demand becomes known before trading
simplifies the analysis without qualitative consequences.
14 All we use in the analysis is that first-period returns are (imperfectly) informative about second-period
returns.
Ííirnl carns high returns, y- 12 in Loth pr.riods aud with probability 1-; returns arc~
low, normalised to y- 0. However, in the bad return state the firm can be reorganized.
wlficlr gerlerates au added value L, R 7 L 1 0, in period t- 2.
The problem of corporate control arises from the fact that after the sale of the firm
in t- 0, the firm is run by managers who always prefer continuation to reorganization.rs
Therefore, reorganisation can only be brought about by outside intervention, whicil
typically costs time and resources. We model this by assuming that an owner who
intervenes in the bad state improves firm value from 0 to L in t - 2, but incurs net
private costs of C c L. With efficient intervention, the firm's value is, therefore, given
by
V' - ~r2R f (1 - ~)(L - C). (2)
We denote per-share-values by lower case letters, e.g. r- R~M, v` - V'~M,
etc. Because it is typically difficult to get a group of owners to act collectively in the
common interest (Diamond, 1984), we assume that intervention costs cannot be shaz~ed
among owners, they must be borne individually. This implies that only a single owner
with a large enough stake in the firm will intervene in the bad state. In other words,
irltervention will occur only if its private gain exceeds its cost.
A final and key assumption, which makes the model non-trivial, concerns the sec-
ondazy mazket for shares. As discussed in the introduction, market pazticipation for
any given stock is typically limited by information costs. In the present context this
means that there is only a limited number of investors who aze able to value and willing
to buy shares from existing shareholders when trading in t- 1. We model this by
assuming that outside investors - those who have not bought shares in t- 0- are less
willing to intervene in the bad state and, therefore, are only ready to bid 0 in that state.
Hence, in the bad state, they provide liquidity only at a discount. This assumption is
stronger than necessary for our analysis, but it allows us to capture in a simple wa~- the
notion that selling out and "active investing" can be confíicting policies, with potentially
different impacts on firm value.rs
15
~rhese managers may well be among the owners of the firm. The important poinL is that their pri-
vate interest in running the firm is stronger than the vatue of cash flow improvements achievable by
reorganisa[ion.
fs The notion of limited market participation can be modelled hy different assumptions of different sophis-
tication. We have chosen the simplest one. One alternative, which gives slightly more complex formulae
and the same results, would be to assume that only a limited number of investors can distinguish [he
good and the bad return states.
81~~c- rlcisc~ nc~. cí~~scril~,tion of tht~ n:odcl by recapitulating t-he timing of acti~-ities in
iLc~ Eollo~~'iuk tíluc'-line-
- Figure 1 here -
3) Concentration versus Dispersion
As noted above, only an owner who internalises the costs of control will intervene
and force management to take the efficient continuation~reorganization decision in the
bad return state. This is the case if and only if his shareholding h` after trading in t- 1
satisfics
h`l~C.
Lc~t T clc~note the smallest. solution to this ineyuality, which we take for sirnplicity- to
lx, iutc~~;er. It is worth pointing out that the fraction T~M necessary to internalise thc
cost of controlling management may be well below the threshold of 50 per cent, or other
majorities required formally for full corporate control. In the U.S., for example, blocks
of 10 - 20 per cent, if established in a publicly traded company, already can be associated
with significant share price increases due to improved corporate contro1.17 In fact, if
applied to publicly listed U.S. companies, our model should be restricted to blocks of
this size or smaller. As Barclay and Holderness (1989) document for large block trades
of NYSE and Amex firms, block premia in such trades can be substantial for blocks of
more than 25 per cent, indicating important private benefits, but are smaller for blocks
below 2~ per cent. Since our model focusses on the private costs of corporate control
rat,her than on the benefits, the model should be restricted to smaller block sizes when
applicd to the group of firms studied by Barclay and Holderness (1989).te
The key determinant of the tradeoff between liquidity and control in our model is
that achicving a certain level of concentration reduces the number of owners. This, in
turn, because outsiders only buy up shares at a discount in the bad state, reduces the
uumber of trading partners in the secondazy market who are read~. to provide liquidity
17 See. c.g., Wruck ( 1989), and IIarclay and Holderness ( 1991). As these studies show, usually the share
price response depends on the nature of the large blockholder.
IH Rut sce the discussion following Lemma 1 below.
~in all states. Heuce, concentratiuu of uwnership, ~i-Lile icnproviiit; the incentit-rs for thc
control of management, reduces ~'aluable trading possibilities for all shareholcíers.
On the other hand, maximum dispersion of shares among initietl nwners iucrca,r,
trading opportunities among those who potentially will pay the full price for shazes in
the bad state, but may lead to a value reducing lack of control because of persistent
ownership dispersion. Notice that dispersion in t- 0 does not necessazily imply that
there is dispersion in t- 1, after liquidity trading. Indeed, one of the patient owners
may buy enough shazes from the impatient owners in the bad state to assemble a stake
of T or more, necessary for efficient intervention. Thus, the relevant question for the
firm - and the main question addressed in this paper - is whether the old owners,
when selling out, should create a controlling block of shazes, hoping that -t persists, or
~~hether initial ownership should be dispersed, which creates more trading opportunities
in secondary trading, with the hope that a controlling block emerges when necessazy in
the secondary market.19 In this section we consider these two alternatives in turn. In
t,he next, we determine under what circumstances either of these ownership structures
dominates.
3.1 Concentrated Ownership
Maximum dispersion of shares is obtained when there aze as many owners as shares,
M. With a controlling block the maximum number of owners is M- T~- 1, because
at least one investor holds a block of at least T shares. Yet, when the firm creates
a controlling block at date t- 0, à priori it is not clear that the initial controlling
owner will actually control the manager at date t- 2 and enforce the efficient continu-
ation~reorganization decision.
The reason is that an initial large owner may himself be impatient, in whicll case he
is only concerned about selling his shares at the highest price. In this case it is possible
in principle that he disperses his block in such a way that no large owner emerges ex
post. However, under the trading structure considered here and under the assumption
of no wealth constraints, concentration will necessarily persist in the secondary market.
The reason for this result is the assumption of non-anonymous trading. Under the given
trading structure, the blockholder has no choice but to sell his block to one buyer, if
he wants to sell. :vlore generally, as long as trading is non-anonymous, any attempt bc
the lazge owner to unlcad his block of shares with several buyers would immediatel~
be reflected in the price, which in turn would remove the incentive to disperse the
19 It will become dear in a moment thal there are no other potentially optimal struclures.
1~bluck. Hctuc, if there is at least one patient shareholder, the laxge owner either sells
his shnrts as a block or keeps them.~o In both cases the large block persists, and the
t~ttiricut ruutitniation~rcotganízation cle~cision is taken. If none of thc initial sbarcholdcrs
is patient, the block and all other shares must be sold to outsiders, in which case the
problem of ex-post concentration is irrelevant.
If the initial ownership structure consists of one large block and a fringe of srnall
owners, ez-post trading in shares has the following structure.
Letnma 1: Suppose the firm in t- 0 has M-T f 1 owners, one holdir.g T shares and
the others each one share. If in t- 1 there are at least two patient owners, then shares
trade at the price
b(I,r) -r
iu the good return state, and
(3)
b(I,0) - l-
T f I (4)
in thc bad state, whcre I is the number of impatient small owners. In the bad state, the
block is preserved, and the blockholder's ex-post position is worth Tb(I,0), regardless
of whethcr he is patient or impatient.
Proof: In the good state, corporate control is not an issue and (3) holds trivially.
Suppose that y - 0, the large owner is patient, and at least one small shareholder is
patient, as well. Then bids by outsiders are irrelevant, because bidding among insiders
alone will drive the price up beyond what outsiders are ready to pay (that is 0).21 If
a small patient shareholder wins the bidding with a bid of b, the maximum number of
shares he will attract is T-~ I (the blot:k and all impatient shares), which will be worth
to him (T f I)(l - b) ~- 1- C. Hence, the optimal bid by the large shareholder, b(I, 0),
keeps the small patient owners indifferent between bidding or not and satisfies:
(T f I)(d - b(I,0)) - C, (J)
which implies (4). By (5), the ]arge owner's profit from making this bid and attracting
tlre impatient shares is the same as the profit from selling his stake at tltis price, rramely
Tb(I,0).
2U This lack of anonymous trading reflects the importance of the initial ownership structure, in contrast to
completely anonymous ownership. In Bolton and von Thadden ( 1996), we consider anonymous trading
as an alternative.
zY ~4'e assume throughout that bidders do not use weakly dominated strategies, a standard assumption in
auction [heory.
lIIí thc larhe oti-ner is inlpatit-nt ancl I ~,L'1 - T- 3, the optim,il bid bE a sulall
u~aner satisfies (;i) by the same argument.
q.e.tl.
Simple as it is, the lemma contains several interesting insights. First, thc large block
is not broken up in liquidity trading, except possibly for the extreme case of every owner
being impatient. This is consistent with the empirical evidence.22 Second, expectecí
future intervention costs are paztially bcrne by the small impatient shareholders. Single
sílares trade at less than their first-best value, and patient sllares are not traded at all.
Third, if in the bad state the large block is sold, it trades at the same price as single
shares, because the anticipated intervention costs are correctly priced. At first glance,
this may look surprising, given the empirical evidence on premia on large block trades
for publicly listed companies in the U.S. (Barclay and Holderness (1989), Mikkelson
and Regassa (1991)). These studies find lazge variations of premia and discounts and
Ilositive median block premia.23 Two observations resolve this discrepancy. First, when
regressing block premia on block size with a sample split at 25 per cent, Barclay and
Holderness (1989) find a large and significant point estimate for block sizes above 25
per cent, and a negative, though insignificant coefficient below 25 per cent.2A As noteci
above, for this group of firms our focus on private costs, rather than benefits of control
is therefore only justified when blocks are not too lazge.
Furthermore, the block trades considered in our model are seller-, and not buyer-
initiated. The available evidence (see, e.g., Holthausen, Leftwich, and Mayers (1987))
suggests that seller-initiated trades are accompanied by significantly lower, sometimes
even negative block premia. 25





See, c.g., Harclay and Holderness ( 1989), who find that "the limited evidence available suggests that
large blucks are scldorn óroken up.~~
For their sample of block trades of NYSE and Amex firms between 1978 and 1982, Barclay and liold-
erness (1989) find a median premium for large blocks of shares o( 15.7 per cent, and block discounts in
20 percent of the transac[ions.
These estimates refer to block premia pei share ( their regression 4 in Table V), which is the measure
considered in Lemma 1.
Note. however, that Holthausen, Leftwich, and Mayers (1987) only consider blocks which are large
in dollar terms, and typically not in percentage terms. R'e know of no study distinguishing between
seller- and buyer-initiated trades ollarge percentage blocks. Yet, such differences seem to be plausible
also !or those blocks, given the wide variations of block discounts~premia doatmented by Barclay and
Iiolderness (1989) and,in a related context, by Wruck (1989).
12~tiiiti~ ~~u,siLlc ru iitc~luclc liarg'aiuitzg ovcr block s~lcs aud buyi r-initiated trad~~s ituo
thi~ uiodcl (e.g., by introducing outsíders with ruidom private benefits in t- 1, as in
GroSSman and l~Iart (1988)), which wuuld generate positice averagt: block premia. ~`~~t.
we have preferred to focus on the simpler model with only liquidity trading.
Proposition 1: The ex-ante value of the firm with at least one large owner is maximized
when there is exactly one large owner with a stake equal to T and all other owners hold
only one share. The block is priced at a discount, and the firm's ex-ante value is
[~o` - 2zrR f (1 - zr)(1 - qM"-Tft)(L - C). (6)
Proof: To have more than one large owner reduces liquidity and does not provide any
iinprovement in the ex-post reorganization~continuation decision. To have a single large
owner with a stake strictly greater than T reduces liquidity and agaín does not improve
ex-post efficiency. This establishes that firm value is maximízed by having exactly one
large ownc,r with a stake T. By Lemma 1, the expected value of the large owner's block
iti
~;11 -~1 - 9)zl'r~1-r ~T~~ - (M -T)7rr~
nr-'~-~ M -T f 1 ~ ~ z ~q~(1 - q)M-Ttt-tT(,~b(i, r) -F (1 - zr)b(z, ~)) (7)
:-o
~ (QM-Tfi f (M - T)(1 - 4)4M-T)T~rr,
and that of a single share
as -~1 - 9)9M T ~V" - (141 - T)zrr~
M-T-I ~ ~M -T~
f
y~(1 - q) M Tf1 :(~rr ~- ( 1 - n)I) z ~-o
M11-T-1
~ ~ ~M-1 ~4~(1 - 9)M-Tft-~(~e(~, r) ~- (1- ~)n(x, o))
;-,
~ (QM-Ttr
f (M - T)(1 - 9)4M-~)~rr.
(g)
Siuce ~i~~ - vB -{- (M -T)vs, (6) follows from (7) and (8) by direct computation. A
further straightforward computation shows that
Tus - z~a -~T - 1)(1 - 9)9M-T~V~ - (M -T)zrr)




13~~ Lich is pusiti~-e.
q.e.d.
Thus, the liquidity cost of having a large owner at date t- 0 is measured entirely
in terms of the implied reduction in the number of owners from :~f to 11 - T f 1. The
simplicity of the expression for Uo` comes from the assumption of no ~~.ealth constraints.
With such constraints, an additional cost of creating a large block is that this block
tnay have to be split up for some realizations of liquidity shocks, thus eliminating the
efficiency gains relating to corporate control.
The fact that the block is priced at a discount at the issue date may seem surprising,
because, by (3) and (4), the shares will trade at their ex-post value in the good state and
in the bad state impatient owners will subsidize the blockholder for the future monitoring
costs. Since everybody has the same liquidity preferences ex ante, one might expect the
costs to be borne equitably at the issue date, and therefore to observe no block discount.
This is not. the case, however, for two reasons wlvch are both reflected in formula (9).
First, as shown iu Lemma 1, small impatient shareholders only bear part of the expected
tnonitoring costs ex post. For the remaining part of these costs, the lazge blockholder
ulust be compensated ex azlte. This corresponds to the second term on the right hand
side of (9).
The second component of the block discount is due to an inherent public goods
problem in the design of ownership structure. From the point of view of the individual
investor, a minimum ownership stake ín t - 0 is desirable, because this maximizes his
liquidity benefits without impairing corporate control ex post. This feature of free-riding
on liquidity provision is quite general;ZS it manifests itself in the present model through
the fact that every owner, regazdless of his stake, has the same chance of benefitting
from liquidity trading ex post. In order to persuade an investor to take on more than
the one share necessary to obtain this benefit, such shares must receive an additional
tliscount, which is given by the first term on the right hand side of (9). It is in this sense
that the blockholder must be compensated for reduced liquidity in the present model.
Empirically, the discounting of blocks at the issue date is well documented. Wruck
(1989) finds small, but significant discounts for block equity placements of NYSE and
.~mex firms.27 Consistent with the prediction of the above proposition; she suggests
28 Sce, r. . 13hattachar a and Gale 1987 for an anal sis of the ~ K. Y ~ ) y public goods problem m liquidity provision
in intcrbank lending.
Z7
I:or reasons we do not know, Wruck measures the discount with res ect to the market p price one day
14i lutt thr~ pricing retiects conrpensation for reduced liquidity and for "factors other than
r~~rhtr.r~d liquidit~~"
In a sirnilar vein, for a sample of private equity placements also covering OTC firms,
Hertze~l and Srnith (1993) report mean discounts of 20.1 per cent.~g They, too, "think it
unlikely that a pure illiquidity effect can explain the magnitude of the discounts we find",
and suggest as an additional explanation, in the spirit of Myers and Majluf (1984) and
slightly different from our explanation, costly monitoring by the blockholder at the issue
date. In a quite different institutional context, Molin (1996) reports a mean discount
of 15.9 per cent on private equity placements on the Stockholm Stock Exchange. As
another possible application of the above argument, it has been pointed out to us that
holding companies in Belgium and Germany generally trade at a discount to the value
of their portfolios. We do not have the data to verify this systematically. If this is true,
however, it provides another manifestation of the discount established in Proposition
l zs
3.2 Dispersed Ownership
~~'hen there is no concentration at date t- 0, the main question is whether an
owner who is large enough to control management emerges after trading in the sec-
ondary market in the bad return state. The main factor preventing the emergence of
a controlling block at date t- 1 is free-riding by small patient owners. Small patient
owners are willing to sell their shares to a large owner only at the ex-post value of these
shares. Hence, if in the bad state a controlling block were to emerge with probability
one, then small patient owners would only be willing to sell their shares at a price l. But
no bidder would offer to buy shares at that price in order to build a controlling block,
because he needs to be compensated for the intervention cost C. For this reason, the
emergence of a controlling block in secondary trading is not guaranteed. There is, how-
ever, an important factor favoring the emergence of a controlling block: liquidity selling
hy the impatient owners. To determine when and how a controlling block emerges, we
need to study in detail the response of individual owners to buy offers in secondary
trading.
before the announcement date. Given that average abnormal returns from day - ] to day 0 alone in her
sample are 1.9 per cent, her numbers underestimate the block discount as more naively defirted.
28 Por the 10 cases where they could ascertain that the placement was with a single investor, the mean
discount is still I1.7 per cent.
`9 óecause holding companies typically provide real control services, their case is different from the more
controversial case of dosed-end mutual funds (see, e.g., Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler ( 1991)).
15Tlre key obervation here is that surall owners considering their sclling decision a~r~e
aware that their decision will have an effect on the overall probability of success uf
u tender uft'er. In our model owners are not atomistic; thus, eve~n if therc arc~ mariv
owners, each owner is aware tlrat he rnay be pivotal with some probability. As is well
known from the theory of takeovers (see Kovenock (1984), Bagnoli and Lipman (1988),
and HolmstrSm and Nalebuff (1992)), when owners are pivotal there are many Nash
equilibria in such tender games. However, one important feature dístinguishes our rnodel
from this literature: owners differ according to their impatience to consume. As in the
case of concentrated shareholding discussed above, impatient owners will tender tlieir
shares with probability one. But the best response of patient owners is not necessarily
unique.
Our problem differs in another way from the existing literature in that we have
competition between identical potential bidders, as soon as there are at least two patient.
owners. Thus, in our model the equilibrium tender offer at date t- 1 must be such
that the owner making the offer is indiíferent between remaining a small patient owncr
and attempting to build a controlling interest. As will bc shown below, iu the bad stato
this adds a binding restriction on trading.
In the good state, regardless of liquidity demand, shazes trade at their ex-post value,
r, and their allocation is irrelevant for the value of the firm. In the bad state, however,
because of the need for intervention, we have to distinguish two cases of liquidity trading;
one where the number of impatient owners is at least T- 1, and the other where it is
strictly less than T- 1.
In the first case equilibrium is easy to chazacterize. If all owners aze impatient,
they sell out to an arbitrary outsider at the competitive price 0. If there is exactly
one patient owner, he also bids 0(or slightly more) and acquires the firm at a discount
reflecting his insider positiorr. More interestingly, if the number of impatient owners, I,
satisfies T- 1 c I C A7 - 2, a controlling block can still be built solely with impatient
shares, and therefore emerges with probability 1. Each patient owner, by remaining
small, gets 1 in the bad state. Since the successful bidder makes a bid strictly below
the ex-post value of the share, all patient owners hold on to their shares. On the other
hand, all irnpatierrt owners sell. Thus, if the outstanding bid is b, the new controlling
owner gets l(I f 1) - C- bI. The equilibrium bid is then given by 1(I f 1) - C- bI - l,
which implies
b(I, 0) - l - Í. (10)
16Tho ~~~tuilibriuni bid b(1,U) has exactly the satne structure as the one in the case of
cc~u~nt.rated sharcholding, (4). Whereas with concentrated shareholding the controlling
,r~kr ~~siscy cx tmte and is known to pcrsist, here such a~take ducs not exist, but is
known to ernerge with certainty in the bad state. Notice that the controlling interest
ernerges despite free-riding by all the patient owners. Ironically, the intervention cost
is entirely borne by the impatient owners. In effect, impatient owners subsidize one
patient owner to exercise control in the firm in the future, so that they can sell out
in the present. This yields an interesting twist to the farnous thesis of "exit, voice,
and loyalty" (Hirschman, 1970) as possible responses to organizational failures. Here,
owners wishing to sell out can indeed choose the "exit" option. However, although
the firm's future does not interest them anymore, they have to pay the price of future
corporate control; "exit" is costly.
In the case where the number of impatient owners is smaller, I G T- 1, things are
more complicated. 5ince in this case there are several Nash equilibria in the tender gamc
bct,weeu patient owners in the bad state, we shall follow the literature and focus on the
iuiiquc syrnmetric mixed strateg,v equilibrium. Note that, since we suppose that there is
runxinnim dispersion ex antc, each owner has only one share to sell at date t- 1. Thus,
all patient owners are identical. Therefore, it is quite reasonable to suppose syrnrnetric
equilibrium behaviour by patient owners.
We begin by introducing some notation. Suppose one patient owner makes an offer
to buy shares in the bad state. Let P- M- I- 1 denote the number of the remaining
patient owners. As indicated above, let m be the (symmetric) equilibrium probability
of selling for each of these P owners. Let S denote the number of patient shares sold in
equilibrium. S is a random variable on {0, ..., P} with density
aP(S;m) - ~SJ
ms(1 - m)P-s
Let Ií - T- I- 1 (1 1) denote the minimum number of patient shares the offer
has to attract in order to generate a controlling stake. Finally, let
P
QP(m) - ~ aP(s;m)
a-h"
~Icnote the equilibrium probability that the tender offer attracts at least K patient
tihares out of P.
17Ilt cquilibriuul, each of the P putt~utial sellers of share, fuust be iltdifferent between
Selling and not selling. Tlris implies the following relationship between t.he outstanding
llid, b, aml tlte sclling probability rft E(0.1):
b - Qi- ~(m)!, (11)
where the left hand side is the (sure) gain from selling and the right haud side thc
expec~ed gain from holding on to the share. Given 6 and m, the bidder's expected
profits are
P P
II-~ aP(s; m)~(I f 1 -f s)l - C)~ -~ aP(s; m)(I f s)b. (12)
s- h~ a-0
The crucial observation now is the following.
Lernma 2: For every bid satisfying (11) one has II` 0.
The proof of Lemma 2 is in the Appendix. Lemma 2 implies that, whenever thcrc
are not sufficient impatient shares to guarantee the success of the tender offer, free-
riding makes the concentration of shares in the bad state impossible. Any bid which is
high enough for patient owners to consider selling - as given by (11) - is too high to
pay off for the bidder. Conversely, a bid which is suf~iciently low to allow the bidder
to recoup the future intervention costs does not attract any patient shares. Hence, if
I C T- 1, dispersion persists with probability 1 in the bad state, and the free-rider
paradox, established by Grossman and Hart (1980) for the case of atomistic owners,
prevails.
The intuition why there is such a stazk contrast between the case of high and low
liquidity trading is the following. If liquidity demand is high in the bad state; bidders
can extract enough value from impatient owners to recoup the intervention costs (as
shown in (10)). On the other hand, as soon as a bid needs patient shares to succeed, it
llas to pay these shares a premium to keep them from free-riding. However, because the
bidder cannot discriminate between patient and impatient owners, he has to pay this
premium to the impatient owners, too, which makes the bid too expensive.3o
Lemma 2 now ilnmediately implies:
a0 Like in most models of (ree-ridin allowin for bids which are conditional on obtainin ]00 g, g g percent of
the shares would resolve the problem formally. }{owever, this is not appealing empirically.
18Proposition L: If the íirtri starts ou( ~~~itlt dispersed ownership i!t t- 0, coricentratiutt
in the bad statc obtains with probability
.aa -i M
~-~(4,T,M)- ~ ~z~4'(1-4)`y-'- (13)
i-T-1 `
The ex-ante value of the firm is given by
Vd - 2rrR ~ ~(1 - rr)(L - C). (14)
Thus the control cost of having no large initial owner is measured entirely in terms
of the probability that ownership fails to become concentrated when necessary ex post.
As in the case of Proposition 1, all ex-post distortions in liquidity trading wash out ex
auf.e. If ald owners or if too few owners are irnpatient, efficient corporate control fails
iu the bad return state, but for two different reasons. In the first case, no shareholder
wants to take on the responsability (and the costs) to control rnanagement, in the second
t~xse no onc is aLde to do it, because of excessive free-riding by other shareholders.
hr practice, of course, a controlling interest is not always built through a simple
tender offer as here. If an owner decides to raise his ownership stake in response to
perceived managerial failures, he may be able to buy out some other owners at lower
prices, reflecting the imperfections of management control. However, through rising
share prices and disclosure requirements the information will get into the market. The
above analysis suggests that if information disseminates too quickly or if takeovers are
very costly, owners will prefer to give up btrilding a controlling interest altogether.31
4) Evaluating the Tradeoff
The previous section has analysed liquidity trading and firm value under the two
relevant ownership structures of our model. In this section we discuss how the choice
ar Note that Lemma 2 and Proposition 2 do nol depend on our assumption that outsiders are less willing
to control management than existing owners. 'fhis is because the problem is caused by free-riding of
existing owners. If there are more than M-T}1 palient owners, a tender ofter must lail regardless ot the
number o( potential bidders.
I9iietween the two structures is infiuenced b~- the chat.3eteristics of the firm anci its en-
~-irotrrnent. Comparing the expressions for Vo and [~ó in equations ( 6) and ( 14). resp..
;hows iuunediat.ely that bó` )[~~~ if and ouly if
M-T-~I - 1-q a10. (1~)
This simple condition is a concise description of the tradeoff between the costs and
benefits of the two ownership structures. If ownership is dispersed, there is a larger
group of investors to trade with, but only a reduced chance, measured by ~, of efficient
corporate control, due to free-riding. Under concentration, corporate control is provided
by the large owner, but because of reduced trading opportunities owners benefit from
it only with a reduced probability, 1- qM-Tfl AS (15) shows, the tradeoff depends
only on three variables: average liquidity demand q, the total number of shares M;
and the efficient controlling stake, T- L M. Other vaziables, in particular a and R,
the determinants of the firm's cash fíow, do not enter. This is a consequence of our
assumption that the costs and benefits of ownership concentration only accrue in bad
cash fiow states. If ownership structure matters in all states, the comparison becomes
uiorc cornplicated.
We first turn to the question of how ownership structure is affected by the investors'
average demand for liquidity, q.
Proposition 3: There is a critical value q - q(T, M) E (0,1) such that concentrated
ownership in t - 0 is optimal for q C q, and dispersed ownership is optimal for q) q.
Proof: Ignoring the dependence of ~ on T and M for the moment and writing ~ -~(q),
we have a(0) - a(1) - 0 and, by straightforward calculation,
~~(q) - M ~M
- 1~qT-z(1 - q).14-Ttl - MqM-l
T-2
Denote the left hand side of (15) by g(q,T). We ha~-e g(O,T) - 1, g(1,T) - 0, and
9a(q,T) - -(M -T -i- 1)qM-T - a'(q)~ (16)
hencc gq(1,T) ~ 0. 9 further straightforward calculation shows that gq(q,T) - 0
implies g9V(q,T) ~ 0. Hence, g as a function of q can have only local minima. By the
above, it therefore has exactly one zero, q, in (0,1).
q.e.d.
?0.~t onc level, Pruposition 3 is intuitive and straightforward: when q is large there is
a liigh value of liquidity (which favours dispersion), and when q is low there is a low valuc~
of liyuidity (wliich favours concentratiou). Howcver, this only concerns the dernand for
liquidity. The less obvious part of Proposition 3, which our analysis brings out, is that
tlcis is also a supply phenomenon. By the assumption of no wealth constraints and
maximum ex-post competition for shares, the supply of liquidity is a constraint only
when all shareholders want to sell out simultaneously in the bad state. This happens
with probability (1 - T)q" where n is the number of initial shareholders. With the
remaining probability of 1-(1 - n)q", share.holders get the full ex-post value of their
shares in both return states, i.e. shares aze fully liquid. If q is large, this probability is
relatively small, so that increasing it by increasing n is relatively valuable. If q is small,
ott the otlrer hand, lacking liquidity is relatively less likely and, therefore, reducing n to
achieve better corporate control is relatively more valuable.
Proposition 3 implies, in particular; that if investors are patient, ownership con-
cc,nt.ration is more likely. This implication is consistent with a particular institutional
fcature of corporate finance iu Germany. Under Gerrnan corporate law, firms can rein-
vest somc of their employees' pension contributions into the own business, as part of thc
firm's liabilities (Pensionsruckstellungen). This possibility is widely used and effectively
makes the employees long-term investors in their firm. Although formally our model
does not have heterogenous investors, it is easy to see that adding a group of patient
investors to the pool of investors in the model has the same effect as increasing average
irrvestor patience, i. e. favouring concentration. Comparing the ownership structures
of German and U.S. or U.K. firms, ownership concentration is indeed one of the most
st.riking differences: in the U.K., 16 percent of the largest quoted firms have an owner
with a stake of at least 25 percent, against 85 percent in Germany (Franks and Mayer,
1994).
We now turn to the relative cost of shareholder intervention. This cost, measured
by the size of the efficient intervention stake T, is influenced by two parameters of the
rnodel, the actual cost of intervening, C, and the benefit brought about by intervention.
L.
Proposition 4: VVhen T increases, the threshold level of average liquidity demand.
y(T, A7), increases; hence, concentration is more likely to be efficient.
21Ycoof: ~Ge 1'iace, for I' c l:t! ~ 1)~2.
gl4:Tf I) -9(q,T)-(1-y)q''-t~~T.lt
l~(f q).n~-~r -q,l-zrti).
It is not difficult, but lengihy, to verify that this expression is positive if g(q,T) - 0.
Furthermore, from the proof of Proposition 3, gy(q(T,M),T) C 0. This irnplies thc
desired result. The case T~ (M ~- 1)~2 is similar.
q.e.d.
Proposition 4 states that if intervention becomes relatively more costly (T in-
creases), concentration becomes more valuable at the mazgin. In other words, when
average liquidity demand q is such that investors are indifferent between concentra-
tion or dispersion, an increase in the relative cost of intervention makes concentration
more attractive than dispersion. Cross-sectionally, one should therefore observe more
concentration of ownerslrip if the relative costs of intervention are higher.
This prcdiction corresponds well to the findings of Demsetz and Lclm (1985) about.
ownership concentration in large U.S. firms, and also casts some new light on their
theoretical arguments. They, too, argue that the costs of monitoring are an important
explanatory variable for ownership concentration. They proxy these costs, which are
directly unobservable, by the volatility of the exogenous factors influencing corporate
performance.32 Empirically, they indeed fmd that firms with higher earnings and stock
price volatility tend to have a more concentrated ownership structure. At the same time,
however, they predict that ownership concentration should also depend positively on
the "control potential", i.e. the potential gain from controlling management. Since they
lneasure this variable again by earnings and stock price volatility, the}- find support for
this hypothesis. Our analysis suggests that this might be too quick a conclusion, driven
by the fact that Demsetz and Lehn (1985) do not model all the costs of concentration.
Indeed, in our model, L can be considered to be a good proxy for the "control potential":
the higher L, the larger the gain from intervention in the low return state. Proposition
4 now implies that, with C held constant, increasing L should on average decrease con-
centration. Wh}- this discrepancy'? The reason is that an increased benefit from control
does llot onlc render ez-ante concentration more attractive, but also makes it easier
to achieve ex po.at, by lowering the stake necessary for efficient intervention. Therefore,
32 "disentangling the eRects of managerial behavior on firm performance from the corresponding effects of
Lhese other,largely exogenous factors is costly" ( Demsetz and Lehn, 1985).
~2bc~rausc, c~x-antc concentration has costs in terms of liquidity, ownership dispei'sion, with
its rcliauce on ex-post trading to achieve intervention, becomes more at.tractive.
Finally, wc~ look at how ownership structure varies with the number of shares, í11,
which we have argued ref}ects the transactions costs of trading. Because the comparative
statics become more difficult, we only do them asymptotically.
Proposition 5: For small values of M, both ownership structures, dispersion or con-
centration, can be optimal, depending on the other parameters. If M tends to infinity,
concentration always dominates.
Proof: Because C G L, qM-T}r -, 0 and a is bounded away from 1 for M ~ oo.
Hence, (15) holds for M large enough. For M - 2(which necessitates T- 2) the left
hand side of (15) becomes (1 - q)(1 - 2q), whose sign depends on q.
q.e.d.
Propositiou 5 states that if shares can be arbitrarily finely divided, concentration
of ownership is always preferable to dispersion. This is intuitive, because in this case
c~~en under ownership concentration the total number of owners; (1 - L)bl -F 1, can
be made large, thus achieving good liquidity without costs in terms of corporate con-
trol. This result confirms a conjecture ofFered by Bhide (1993) in a study of corporate
governance issues of publicly traded U.S. companies. Bhide suggests that combining
a thick secondary market for shares with the presence of a large controlling block can
potentially solve the corporate governance problem. Our analysis shows that, in the
framework of our model, this is correct, if shares are arbitrarily divisible. On the other
hand, if transactions costs of trading are taken into account, the denomination of shares
is typically bounded below by the costs of transacting, and thick secondary markets can
no longer be taken for granted. In fact, secondary market liquidity then is one element
in the design of corporate ownership structure. and more generally of capital market
structure, which is subject to the tradeoff anal}'sed in this paper.
5) Conclusion
The present paper has developed a simple framework in which to analyze costs and
benefits of ownership concentration, if the efFiciency of corporate control and secondary
23inarki,t liquidit~ are botli takerr irrto account. An important assumption has been that..
in some circunrst~uices, the number of im-estors holding the firm's stock can he important
for secondary market trading. This assumption, which relics on the icíea that firms ar~~
not monitored perfectly by the market, is a convenient simplification of the general
insight that market participation is limited by transaction costs.
A second simplifying assumption of the analysis has been to ignore wealth c:on-
straints. This assumption allows us to obtain simple expressions for the pricing of
shares in ex-post trading, because in each contingency owners have enough wealth to
pay the ex-post value of all impatient shares. If this is not the case, ex-post competitiorr
becomes more complicated. However, under reasonable pricirrg mechanisms the two
important qualitative features of ex-post ownership remain unchanged: with ex-ante
concentration the controlling block, and hence efficient corporate control, persists in
bad states of nature, whereas with ex-ante dispersion a controlling block fails to emerge
if liquidity trading is low. For our analysis to hold, this is all that counts (cf. Propo-
sitions 1 and 2), because ex-post distortions and redistributions wash out ex ante by
symmetry.
One unrealistic implication of the present model should be pointed out, namely the
prediction that in the long run there is a tendency for ownership to be concentrated.
This implication results from the assumption that the firm is put up for sale once and
trade afterwards takes place mainly among existing owners, who sell out over time.
This assumption ignores the fact that if the firm has been in the hands of a potentially
decreasing number of owners for long enough, it may be put up for sale to attract a new
group of (possibly dispersed) owners. Incorporating this feature into a dynamic model
of ownership change yields an alternating structure of dispersion and concentration,
which is more appealing empirically. We consider such a structure in Bolton and von
Thadden (1996) in the context of a model of overlapping generations of investors.
To concludc the paper, it is worth noting that the general problem raised in this
paper does not only apply to equity financing. Conceptually, the liquidity-control trade-
off is also relevant. to debt financing. Thus, one of the benefits of bank financing is that,
with a sufficiently large stake, a bank may be willing to monitor the firm and guide
~narragerial decisions. Of course, since the bank itself is not a major stockholder it may
not take the ex-post efficient continuation decision. But, even if the bank does not nec-
essarily act in the interest of stockholders, it is likely that its interests are more in line
with those of other debt holders. However, for other debt holders, the cost of having
a large barrk is sorne lack of liquidity. This is why bond financing may sometimes be
24l~i~~ferri~d to bank finaning. An interesting question cuncerning bond financing then is
~~~h}- thcre does not secm to be a parallel for bonds to the notion of a controlling interest
fur ~tocks. Is this due to regulatory restrictions? Is it duc to the fact that with most
bonds bondholders are unlikely to ever be in a position where they can exercise control?
These are questions for further research.
25Appendix: Proof of Lemma 2
Denot c bv
~
Ek(m) - Q~ (m) E[S~S 1 K~ -~ saP(s; m)
s- h'
the expected number of patíent shares including and above the threshold level that are
sold in equilibrium. Using the fact that C- 1T, expected profit.s from bidding L, given
by (11) in the main text, then are
II - (1 - a)IEP(m) - (1 - a)IKQk (m) - (I f mP)(b - ~rr) -}- ~rr. (A1)
Notice that
P s (P 1
(1 - m)Qi t(m) - ~(1 - P)` s ~m'(1 - m)~ ,
- Qi(m) - 1,Ei(m).
y-E~ `
Inscrting (A2) into ( 10) and all into (A1) yields
(A2)
(1 - ~r)1 rM - 1
k( ) ~ ( ) ~QK( )] (A3) U- 1-m ` p E-m - mM-T fT-1 m far.
Denote the term in squaze brackets in (A3) by F(m). We have
Qh-i(ra) - Qh. 1(m) f(p -
llmt~-~(1 - m)P-~.
`lí - 1 J
Therefore,
F'(ra)- ~(M - 1)K - P(T - 1) - mP(M - T)~ ~p - l~mk~-'(1 - m)P-h~ -
Ií - 1
Remembering that P- M- I- 1 and Ií - T- I- 1, we have for m~ 0,
(M-1)K-P(T-1)-mP(.1~1-T)c0.
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